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. ATIATIOW AND ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . *  
By R. H. Mayo. 
Under present conditions, t ransportat ion by a i r  i s  not a 
eo-mercial Froposition. Nevertheless, the  governments of nearly 
a l l  the  gzeat powers hase def in i te ly  decided t o  grant aid t o  air  
t ra f f ic  companies, so t h a t  they may not be jeopardized by finar,- 
c i a1  d i f f i cu l t i e s .  
This governrr,ent a id  chief ly  takes the f o m  of d i rec t  subsk- 
dies, France has granted such large subsidies t ha t  French COEI- 
n e rc i a l  aviat ion seei'iis t o  be enjoying a considerable degree of 
prosgerity. 
English aviat ion is  Just s o  much less  prosperous. 
both the French and English comcercial air  semices  a re  i n  a very 
England has offered l e s s  ge-nerous subsidies and 
I n  r ea l i t y ,  
unsat isfactory condition. 
countries do not pay expenses without a id  and w i l l  probably not 
be able -i;o do so f o r  man;. years t o  coi'rle. 
s t a t e  of affai,rs are too cany and complex for me t o  attempt EinY 
general consideration of them i n  t h i s  art icle.  
The air t ra f f ic  companies of both 
The reasons fo r  t h i s  
There is ,  however, one aspect of the  question vhich is all- 
important f o r  the future development of commercial aviat ion,  t o  
w i t ,  aviat ion insurance, concerning which it may be worth vhile t o  
aake a f e w  remarks based on the experience acquired s ince the  be- 
ginning of c i v i l  aviation. + 
It may be said, -&.ti? reason, t ha t  there i s  no large industry 
i n  mhich insurance does not play an important role. 
* From "Premier Congrss Internatiolnal de la Navigation A&rienne, 
Par is ,  Hovember, 1921, V o l .  I ,  pp. 182-187. 
The stabi1it;r - 
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of companies engaged 
i n  large aeasure, on 
i n  the older' forms of t rmspor ta t ion  depends 
moderat ion i n  insurance rafJes. The public, 
by water, i f ,  on every t r i p ,  the stockholders had to risk the  loss 
of t h e i r  c a p i t a l  i n  case of accident. 
denly go out of bxsiness, Bri t ish t ransportat lon e n t e q r i s e s  by 
water and a goodly number o f '  similar foreign enterpr ises  would go 
out of business the next day. 
of sat isfactory insurame, conditions i s  indispensable t o  the corn- 
ruercial prosperity of any enterprfse whose capital. i s  invested in 
anything susceptible of being damaged o r  destroyed. 
If the LJ-oyds should sud- 
it may be said tha t  the  existence 
As regards air t r a f f i c  companies, an insurance systea Zs gr'ad- 
ually being established, but the existence of t h i s  system is s t i l l  
precarious and i t s  development haB not Seen so sapid as had been 
hoped. The object of t h i s  a r t i c l e  is t o  consider some of the 
causes which hinder i t s  development. 
Nature of Aviation Risks. 
There are four princfpal  kinds of civil aviat ion insurance: 
1, Legal responsibi l i ty  of air t r a f f i c  companies: 
a) Toward passengers; 
b) Toward employed; 
c )  Regarding freight. 
2. Personal insurance of passengem and pilots. 
3. Damage t o  t h i r d  pa r t i e s ,  
4. Damags t o  a i rplanes afid other property of aviat ion cori~a- 
nies. 
It i s  evident t ha t ,  f n  general, conditions a f fec t ing  one of 
the above classes  of insurame a l s o  a f f ec t  all the others. If a 
coapany suf fers  but l i t t l e  damage t o  i t s  a i r c r a f t ,  i ts passengers 
and employes are  rarely injured. However, i t  does not fo l low 
- necessarily tnat  a comgany, Those eiiiployes and passengers aze 
rarely tbe v i c t i m  of accidents, seldom suffers  damsge t o  i t s  air- 
planes. An analysis of the s t a t i s t i c s  of accidents, that  have 
happened i n  c i v i l  aviat ion since the an i i s t ioe ,  shows that the 
number of  accidents, i n  Thich the p i l o t  and passengers were k51I-a.7- 
o r  even injured, has been remarkably small. It i s  doubtless due 
t o  %hi's -Tact t ha t  c i v i l  aviat ion has prospered as it, has and t h a t  
the nwcbezr of  passengers carried. has r isen so  rapidly and mm- 
stant ly ,  The number of a i  rp lane accidents, however, has been 
lamentably 'nigh. %lien an accident causes the death of several  
passengers, the newspapers display it on the f irst  page, s o  t ha t  
the a t ten t ion  of the pu5iic i s  foscrbly drawn t o  it. I f ,  on tkre 
other hand, there  i s  an accident i n  which there  are no victims 
among the passengers o r  crew, the public hears nothing of it. 
This  a t t i t ude  is very natural ,  of course, and it is  evidently t o  
the advantage of air t r a f f i c  companies not t o  have t h e i r  losses  
continually displayed before the public. Nevertheless, the corn- 
panies must, 5n t h e i r  own in t e re s t ,  frankly face the s i tua t ion  
and make .it. determined e f fo r t  t o  reduce the number of accidents, 
The accidents i n  question are not simple unimportant incidents,  
oausing, f o r  exmple, the  wreck of a landing gear o r  propeller,  
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serious accidents,  sometimes causing the  conplete destmotion 
of the airplane.  I n  .many cases, passengers and p i l o t  have eecap- 
ed death o r  sevem in ju r i e s  only through a for tunate  combination 
of circumstances. 
While these accidents have not been noted by the public,  
they have been very carefGlly considered by insurance oompanfes. 
It i s  not (correct t o  believe,  as i s  comonly done, that  insur- 
ance conpanies 02 t h e i r  tezhaical  advisers lack p rac t i ca l  sxper- 
ience an& that the technical  sides of aviat ion are not  familiar 
t o  them. On the oontrary, they keep well infomed on a l l  these 
questions mci know the exact significance of such accidents. 
They f u l l y  rea l ize  t h a t  the relative Tmmunity of air  t r a f f i c  com- 
panies, as regards fatal  acGidents, has been due t o  good luck, 
ra ther  than t.0 the efficiency of technical  organizatlons. 
companies, having t o  t h e i r  d i scred i t  a considerable number of ac- 
cidents,  have been insured, i f  not against  a11 t h e i r  r i sks ,  at 
l ea s t  against some of tbem. The resu l t  is that insurance compa- 
nies ,  which had the  courage t o  engage i n  avlat ion insurance, are  
far from being remunerated for t h e i r  effor-bs. 
ably that insurance premiums must be increased, ra ther  than re- 
duced. 
W i l l  continue t o  take &viation risks, if the present s i tua t lqn  
Some 
It f o l l o w s  inevit- 
Boreover, it cannot be expected tha t  insurwce companies 
remains mcharLged. 
kept i n  touch wizh the progress 09 Ic3.ivll aviat ion and have been 
awaiting the time when the l a t t e r  could of fe r  a sa,tisfa&ory basis 
Thus far, French insurance comFanies have 
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~ O P  f ix ing  the rates .  Prac t ica l ly  a l l  aviation insurXiI.ct? has 
. . I  en v-r:c--c:xz,5:en '2- r )  2:.ng;.lish insurance companies and *heir  experj--- 
cncs has been such as t o  discourage Frenoh companies from fox- 
lowing t h e i r  example u n t i l  conditions improve. Aviation insur- 
Snce ventures undertaken by English companies h8ve not,  i n  f a c t ,  
been mrccessful and several  large companies h v e  been obliged, t o  
stop taking aviat ion r i sks .  
' - Causes of Accidents. 
The Trequent accidents t o  a i rplanes employed on afr routes 
Probsbly 9% of e'heru. have been due t o  widely d%vwgox& causes. 
were due t o  carelessness and could have been avoided, had the 
necessary precautions been taken, 
dents may be enumerated as follows: 
The principal  causes 6f acci- 
1. Poor pSloting; 
8, Engtne trouble ; 
3. Lack of system; 
4. Poorly adapted afrplanes;  
5. Poor airdromes; 
60 Unfavorable meteorological conditions. 
1. - Poor Pilot-. 
A cer ta in  nwber  of p i l o t s  employed on int;ernational air 
routes have had long and var ied experience an6 are f u l l y  qual i f ied 
€or t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  work, but it i s  evident tllat a large propor- 
t i o n  of the p i l o t s  employed are 'by no means of the first order. 
\ 
I n  order tha t  transportation by air  may be reasonably eh- 
\ 
trusted t o  a p i l o t  , he must possess very special qualifications.  
IIe must have had much experlence i n  p i lo t ing ,  particularly under 
unfaworable weather conditions, He must knov h i s  route, h i s  air- 
plane and h i s  engine and, above all, he must be resolute and 
0001. Such p i l o t s  are  ra re  and, of course, can comand high sal- 
ar ies ,  
would save much more than the i r  sa la r ies  during the course of %fie. 
year by knowing how t o  avoid awidents ,  they xould real ize  the 
If companies would consider that  p i l o t s  of the first rank 
. .  
false economy of employing inexperienced p i l o t s .  
believed tha t  only the best  p i l o t s  a re  employed i n  commercial 
aviation. Such is not at a l l  the case. I n  rea l i ty ,  the sa la r ies  
offered by most companies are so small t h a t  no f i r s t -c lass  pi105 
can aocept them. 
accidents, a high percentage of which are  found t o  be due t o  
It is generally 
The result is.apparent Zn an analysie of the 
poor piloting. 
Sometimes the most elementary errors have been committed 
from lack of experienoe. Sometimes expensive airplmes and even 
the f ives  of several/have been entrusted t o  young p i l o t s  who did 
passengers 
not know the route. Some English and Fmnch companies employ on- 
l y  f i r s t -c lass  p i lo t s ,  w i t h  beneficial  resul ts ,  as regards t he i r  
expenses for repairs o r  the i r  insurance premiums. It i s  evident- 
Ly d i f f i cu l t ,  however, for an insurance company t o  form an exact 
idea of the respective qua l i t i e s  af each p i l o t  and, so long a6 
most afr traffic companies continue t o  employ any poor p i l o t s ,  
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insurance rates w i l l  necessarily remain high, 
diSferent insumnc@e companies a,ssocj.ated with Lloyds haTre e s t a b  
I n  England, the 
fished a r eg i s t e r  containing informat ion on all. l icensed B r i t i s h  
p i l o t s ,  including in  most cases, d e t a i l s  of t he i r  experience. 
This reg is te r  has given good r e su l t s  i n  England and it i s  t o  be 
hoped that  a similar r eg i s t e r  may be established i n  France. 
I_ 2. - Engine Trouble. 
I Thus far,  civil. aviat ion has had t o  use engines designed fo- 
Such engines, though l i t t l e  adap,ted t o  t h e i r  present use:, war. 
usually ruT? a l l  r ight ,  provided all possfble precautions a re  taken. 
For many reasons, however, there  have been inmmerable cases 
09 engine trouble on nearly every type of engine employed on air 
traffic l ines ,  O m  of' these reasons i s  tha t  the engines a r e  not 
i n  proper condftion when delivered t o  the  air traffic companies. 
They were made, f o r  the m i s t  part, during the war, o r  of parts 
taken from war stocks, and have not been given the a t ten t ion  nec- 
essary t o  eliminate defective parts. Another source of trouble 
is the f a c t  that  a l l  the w a r  engines were built  f o r  efficfenQ-, 
ra ther  than safety,  8.0 t h a t ,  i n  order t o  keep them i n  proper 
condition, they require the a t ten t ion  of t h e  best  mechanics de- 
t a i l e d  verif i ca t ion  t e s t s  and frequent overhauling. 
a l s o  often r e su l t  from faulty in s t a l l a t ion  of the engine. The 
mannef: of i n s t a l l i n g  engines on airplanes now i n  use s t i l l  -tGs 
many disadvantages which exis ted before the  war and it i s  only at 
the  price of t he  most a l e r t  a d  conscientious a t ten t ion  of t h e  
Troubles 
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mechanics that trouble can be avoided. If it i s  t rue tha t  most 
companies employ qu1i;e competent mechaafcs, there is st i l l  zoom 
f o r  considerable improvement , as evidenczd by the large nmber 
of crases of engine txaible,  
The pr ize  recently offered by the French comqittee on aezo- 
nautic propaganda, f o r  a ~oamaro5af engine, i s  a step i n  the 
right direction. 
nearly eliminated, Znsurance rates ~ 3 1 1  fall. 
As soon as engine troubles are eliminated o s  
3. - L w k  of S>rsteE1. 
The systemization of the air service comprises 8 large nwn- 
ber of new problems, which cannot be completely solved without 
much more experience. I t  i s  manifestly impossible t o  consider 
a l l  these problems i n  deja21 i n  so short  an a r t i c l e ,  but it may 
be noted tha t  a Urg9 number of amidents  may be ascrlbed t o  
lack of sys+,em. 
The directors  of air traffic companies sometimes have ii ten-- 
dency t o  forget t h a t  the foundation of success l i e s  i n  a techni- 
ca l ly  perfect system. They sometimes seem t o  imagine themselves 
s t i l l  i n  the-time of the w a r ,  when the  only important thing was 
t o  aceomplish the a l l o t t e d  task and the  destruction of an air- 
plane was a matter of small concern. 
r 
The success of any commercial enterprise w i l l  always depend 
largely on the systematfc organization of t he  personnel and the 
mployment of corrpetent engbeers  f o r  superintendsing a11 techni- 
cal operations. 
k 
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4, - ?oorly Adzpted Aitrplanes. 
Nost of the ai rplanes i n  um hm=: been designed I since the  
war, although some of them are  a thptsbl io~s of mi l i ta ry  designs. 
The designera of these commercial a i rplanes have, however, devo%eeci 
t h e i r  effor ts .  espeaially t o  the qxkwtion of efficiency. They hat-e 
e i ther  forgotten the question of safety o r  e l se  coccluded that 
airplanes have already at ta ined a sat lsfactory s t a t e  of safety,  
So long as the companies are subsfdized by the government, these 
designers may be r igh t ,  but, if some day, comerasfa1 aviat ion 
finds itself' thrown upon i ts  omn resou2.:.oea, it w i l l  be obliged t o  
recognize the necessity of insurance and then engineers w i l l  be 
forced t o  consider ser iously the question of safety, i n  order t o  
obtain a lowering of insurance rates ,  The question of safety i s  
affected by a large number of factors ,  the most important of 
vhich is  the Landing speed. 
Of airplanes i n  use have a very heavy load per square meter and 
a high landing speed. 
houz a re  the  rule ,  ra ther  than the  exception. 
With one o r  two exceptfons, the types 
Landing speeds of 80 km. (50 miles) per  
Every p i l o t  knows 
khat such a spesd i s  a formidable source of danger, Accidents 
follow accidents for the sane muses: engine trouble,  a forced 
landing and no f i e l d  i n  sight where an airplane can land i n  safety. 
Some progress has been made i n  s c i e n t i f i c  reaearches on wings with 
3, large coefficierit of Lift, but no p r a c t i c a l  appl icat ion of 'such 
-researches has yet been made, at least as regards landing speeds, 
'%e only object i s  eff ic iency and, as soon as an increase i n  the 
l i f t  of the wirigs i s  obtained, the designers hasten 'co u t i l i z e  it 
, 
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f o r  increasing the effioiency o r  the load. 
Air t r a f f i c  corapaniee can xeaedy clizectly the four pr incipal  
causes of accidents enmerated abave, There 1s another cause, 
which can only be dirninated by constant insis tence with the gov- 
ernmenCal bodies conoerned, naaely, the  ~ o o r  condition of the 
psineipaS, airdromes. I t  is unfortunately t rue t h a t  the three air- 
dromes of Le Bourget, Croydon and Everc present defects which have 
been the d i rec t  cause of many accidents. Neither one of  them has 
a good landing f i e l d  axld , at Le Bourget and Everc, the  f i e l d  i s  so  
bad i n  places ,  that one is never surprised t o  see  an airplane turn  
t u r t l e  a f t e r  landing. P i l o t s  t r y  t o  avoid  the bad places,  but do 
not always firid it  possible to do so. Uoreover, the l m d  around 
Le Bourget, excepthg  on the north, is  unfavorable f o r  forced 
landings and the location and arrangement of the Groydon airdroiile 
could hardly be wome. I t  i s  t o  be hoped that the different  gov- 
esnniental authori t ies  n i l1  some day ,arrive at the conclusion that 
a good airdrome wov.ld be o f  Euch greater  benefi t  than a superb 
custom-house. In the meant%me, the air t r a f f i c  companies rust  
help themselves by improving t h e i r  organization, so they can oper- 
a te  i n  s p i t e  of unfavozrable conditions. 
I t  is likewise t o  be deplored that s o  l i t t l e  has been done 
i n  es tabl ishing intermediate landing f i e l d s  on the pr incipal  air  
routes, Later, when the sourcces of danger have been removed, 
emergency landing f ie lds .  m i l l  lose  t h e i r  importance, but f o r  many 
years t o  come they w i l l  be extremely valuable. If 
always f ix3  a landing f i e l d  soon a f t e r  discovering 
complete engine breakdowns could of ten be Eivoided. 
p i l o t s  could 
any defect,  
6. - Unfavorabls €!eteorologbcal Conditions. 
Although atmospheric conditions on the  pr incipal  afr routes 
are  a constant source of anxiety f o r  air t r a f f i c  companies xnd 
tend contirmally t o  prevent the  nomial operation 03 the l ines ,  - 5 %  
i s  in te res t ing  %o note that  hardly a s ingla  accident can be attrib- 
uted t o  unfavoyable weather conditions. 
loting have been accentuated by such conditions, but,  i n  the 
c o u m e  of a year, there have been very few says when the weather 
%as bad enough t o  const i tute  a source of r e a l  daiiger t o  a first- 
c lass  p i lo t .  
if the conditions a r e  r e a l l y  too  dangerous and- h i s  deofsion w i l l  
have suff  i c ien t  m i g h t  
cia1 director ,  who might perhaps consider regularity o f  service 
o f  more importance than safety. 
The e f f ec t s  of  poor  pi- 
A truly competent p i l o t  : ~ f l l  not undertake a voyage, 
t o  overcome the  opposition of t h e  cornier- 
-.-# 
Governments have done mueh for the improvement o f  the meteor- 
ologtcal aervice and, if they continue t o  do so ,  the weather m i l l  
become an almost negl igible  factor  as a direct cause of accidents. 
C onclu s ion. 
I have t r i e d  t o  indicate  b r i e f ly  a few of the causes of the 
many accidents which account f o r  the high insurance rates.  
xould have preferred t o  give def in i te  examples i n  each chapter and 
statistics proving my contentions, but i t  is evident tha t  non- 
I 
ka - 
o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  could not be published i n  this a r t i c l e .  
I w i s h  t o  say 2s that the opinions expressed above are  founded 
on experience acquired i n  the  professi.onal invest igat ion of a 
great number of accigents and i n  the czpacity of technical advisor 
A l l  
of the  different parties eroncerned 
It may be objected t h a t  it is  inojjprtune to emphasize t h i s  
a-spect of the psobiem, while cormezcial aviat ion %a f ight ing f o r  
i t s  very existence. 
coqan ie s  can have a future ,  only by facing the  f a c t s .  as they are 
and by endeavoring t o  build a solid foundation foz  commercial avi- 
I arn convinced, hoxever, t ha t  air t r a f f i c  
ation. Government subsidies obscure %he Clear view of the fac ts ,  
If these subsidies should be withdram, c o i w r c i a l  aviat ion muld. 
-immediately collapse. It is  possible that  some day the govern- 
ments may decide t o  withdraw the subsidies o r  reduce them Consid- 
erably, i n  which case commercial aviat ion will have t o  f i gh t  f o r  
3 - t ~  existence o r  succumb. An established system of aviat ion in- 
surance w5th moderate rates w i l l  then be indispensable t o  its ex- 
istence,  but it is only at; t h e  price of the most determined e f fo r t s  
’ t o  eliminate t he  causes of danger that  such a qrstem can be es- 
t ab li shed. 
Translated by the National Advisory Committee f o r  Aeronautics. 
